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Ethnic solidarity and the vote: Mapuche candidates and voters in Chile

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ABSTRACT

In this article, we evaluate ethnic solidarity and the vote in Chile with reference to the Mapuche, the largest and most traditional ethnic group in the country. We use electoral data from the mayoral elections of 2012, drawn from all the municipalities of the Araucanía, the region with the largest percentage of Mapuche population. Using a multi-level linear regression model and controlling for poverty and rurality, we found that Mapuche candidates, regardless of their political orientation, were indeed more successful than non-Mapuche candidates in areas with the greatest concentration of Mapuche voters. Additionally, we used results from an unpublished opinion survey conducted in three municipalities of the Araucanía. We concluded that after controlling for other variables ethnic solidarity prevails as a robust predictor of electoral behaviour, albeit more strongly in rural areas than urban ones. The Chilean case, moreover, is useful for studying the strategies used by the traditional parties that promote this solidarity – that is, by presenting candidates with Mapuche surnames in their lists.

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Elections; ethnic vote; solidarity and voting; Mapuches; Chile; survey

Introduction

There is an extensive literature about the causes that explain the emergence and features of the ethnic parties (Van Cott 2003, 2005; Basedau and Moroff 2011; Chandra 2011), their electoral success (Chandra 2004; Ferree and Horowitz 2010), and, in some cases, the study of the ethnic voters as ‘bloc voting’ (Wolfinger 1965; Mattes 1995; Norris and Mattes 2003; Collet 2005; Ishiyama 2012). Nevertheless, the study of the electoral behaviour of ethnic groups considering opinion polls and aggregate data by districts has been less attended. Although there have been similar studies in the United States (Landa, Copeland, and Grofman 1995), there is no an extensive production for this phenomenon in Latin America (an exception is the research of Raymond and Arce (2011)).

Our paper discusses two approaches that explain the ethnic solidarity on the vote. Following Horowitz (1985, 1993), ethnic solidarity on the vote has a psychological connection between the voter and the political party. Support a party that represents an ethnic group implies defend the interests of a collective group, in this case, an ethnic group. For other authors, the decision to vote for an ethnic party respond to a strategic calculation. The

voters expect patronage and clientelistic linkages with candidates respond to their interests (Chandra 2011). Whatever be the right approach, it is clear that the ethnic identification of the candidates works as an ‘informational shortcut’. However, ¿what about the party systems where there are no ethnic parties? ¿How the ethnicity of candidates influence the electoral behaviour of the voters? ¿Which incentives have the parties for nominate ethnic candidates?

Our argument is that ethnic solidarity not only exists in the countries with high rates of ethnic population, but also this occurs in countries with low levels of ethnic population and institutionalised party systems. Strategically, the parties nominate candidates with ethnic origin in districts with high rates of the ethnic population under the expectative that the ethnic informational shortcut is stronger than the ideological informational shortcut. In an institutionalised party system with strong programmatic links (Kitschelt et al. 2010), it is expected that ideological informational shortcut is always predominant. Nevertheless, our evidence goes in the opposite way. Thus, traditional parties get two goals simultaneously. First, avoid the emergency of ethnic parties. Second, improve their electoral performance, nominating candidates with ethnic appeals recognised by voters. In fact, if we observe the political militancy of the Mapuche candidates from the first Mayoral election in 1992 (after the return of democracy in Chile) to the 2012 Mayoral elections, we can see that throughout all elections, Mapuche candidates are predominantly of a traditional party, both left and right-wing parties (see Table 1).

The case: Mapuche candidates and the Chilean voters

While there is ample literature on the electoral conduct of Chileans (López 2004; Morales 2008; Morales and Navia 2010, 2012), little has been written about the behaviour of specific groups and in particular of the indigenous population, apart from the work of Morales and González (2011), Jaramillo (2013), and Toro and Jaramillo-Brun (2014). There are studies of the determinants of the emergence of indigenous parties in Latin America (Madrid 2005a, 2005b, 2011; Van Cott 2005), but less is known about the electoral conduct of indigenous voters, and especially about the influence of ethnic solidarity on the vote – that is whether indigenous citizens vote for indigenous candidates (Birnie 2007).

It is often thought that the existence of an institutionalised party system like Chile’s (Valenzuela and Scully 1997; Morales and Navia 2010, 2012) not only blocks the

Table 1. Mapuche candidates with at least one Mapuche surname, Mayoral election 1992–2012.

Election	N° of candidates from traditional political parties		N° of candidates from non-traditional political parties		Total Mapuche candidates N°
	N°	%	N°	%	
Municipal elections 1992	50	73.5	18	26.5	68
Municipal elections 1996	53	76.8	16	23.2	69
Municipal elections 2000	46	85.2	8	14.8	54
Mayors 2004	13	59.1	9	40.9	22
Mayors 2008	18	78.3	5	21.7	23
Mayors 2012	9	64.3	5	35.7	14
Total period 1992–2008	189	75.6	61	24.4	250

emergence of indigenous parties, but also restricts the impact of ethnic solidarity as a factor in the vote, in that the traditional parties often opt for candidates with a national profile as against local leaders. According to our evidence, not only do the traditional parties include indigenous candidates, but these candidates actually achieve better electoral results in polling stations with a larger percentage of indigenous voters.

To prove the hypothesis of ethnic solidarity we analysed the results of the 2012 local elections in all the municipalities belonging to the Araucanía (Chile's 9th Region), the part of the country with the greatest percentage of Mapuche voters.¹ We included an analysis of opinion surveys conducted in three municipalities of the region (Saavedra, Cholchol y Curarrehue). The study contemplates three levels: (a) Electoral results at the local level in the 2012 municipal elections; (b) Electoral results by polling station; and (c) Individual results (surveys). In the Araucanía there are municipalities with high percentage of Mapuche population and a large number of Mapuche candidates, while others have a low percentage on both dimensions. Consequently, even though we only analyse the Araucanía – given that our interest is in the ethnic solidarity of the Mapuche population – we are able to avoid bias in our selection of cases. The Araucanía provides us with sufficient variation in the predominance of the Mapuche population and the presence of Mapuche candidates.

With this triple-level analysis (municipalities, polling stations, and individuals), we seek strengthen our conclusions. Since electoral and socio-demographic data are usually available by municipality, the common practice is to make a very general inference that does not include individual behaviour. To correct this, the literature on electoral conduct covers this gap with opinion surveys. In this study, apart from an analysis of aggregate data by municipality, what we do is a study by polling station. By counting the number of Mapuche electors registered in each polling station, we calculate the portion of Mapuches per total number of inscribed voters. Later, where there are Mapuche mayoral candidates, we calculate the portion of votes they received in each polling station.

Let us suppose that variations of ethnic solidarity are found not only between municipalities, but also within municipalities depending on the portion of Mapuches in each polling station. To make this inference we have to be cautious in making comparisons. If we find that in polling station X the portion of Mapuches is 70% and the Mapuche candidate obtained 65% of the vote, this evidence would not be sufficient to sustain the ethnic solidarity hypothesis. For that purpose we would need, additionally, to compare polling station X with another polling station where the portion of Mapuches is smaller. Let us imagine that polling station Z has a portion of Mapuches of 10% and the Mapuche candidate obtained 65% of the vote. Analysing this result would indicate that the Mapuche candidate has a solid electoral base not only among voters of his or her ethnic group, but also in the rest of the population. Consequently rather than ethnic solidarity what this result shows is the candidate's overall popularity. On the other hand, if in polling station Y, which has a 10% portion of Mapuches, the Mapuche candidate achieves 20% of the vote, by comparing this polling station with polling station X, we could indeed speculate about ethnic solidarity. If this result becomes a tendency, the solidarity hypothesis is consolidated.

This analysis has three limitations that could weaken specific interpretations, but not necessarily the tendency of the results:

- (a) The mechanism for identifying Mapuche voters and candidates is somewhat arbitrary. We decided to count a Mapuche voter or candidate by their surnames, a very traditional practice in this type of study (Carlson 1984). We assigned zero points to anyone without any Mapuche surname; one point to anyone with one Mapuche surname; and two points to anyone whose two surnames are Mapuche. As can be seen from much of the literature discussed below, surnames are the main proxy indicators of ethnicity. Even though the physical aspect of a candidate, as well as ability in the maternal language, is usually relevant in generating an ethnic identification while he or she is campaigning, surnames are the most objective indicator available to us. Moreover, the candidate's surname can contribute to reducing the cost to voters of information (Birnier 2007). Knowing the candidate's surname, even without having had any physical contact with him is enough for the voter to be able to distinguish him from one who does not belong to the ethnic group. It is worth mentioning that while there is an intense debate in the literature on this point, a surname associated with an ethnic group may be more relevant than the candidate's party ticket in explaining electoral conduct. This typically occurs in less stable party systems or where the cult of personalities has greater play. With the exception of systems with clearly established ethnic parties, voting based on ethnic solidarity can lead to greater levels of volatility. As we are dealing with a cult of personalities rather than parties, it is very probable that electoral support will change significantly from one election to another. The example of Peru is a clear case in point (Madrid 2011, 268).

Surnames are definitely the best available indicator of ethnic affiliation (Carlson 1984, 669). By counting only those voters and candidates who have a Mapuche surname we exclude those who might identify themselves as Mapuche but do not have a surname that identifies them as such. We could resolve this by interviews or with personal information about all the candidates for mayor or councillor in the Araucanía, but to do the same for voters is impossible. Consequently, the analysis would be biased in favour of one group (the candidates). To identify Mapuche surnames we rely on Painemal (2011), whose text features in the National Corporation of Indigenous Development (CONADI).

- (a) Our analysis is limited to the Araucanía, the region with the greatest percentage of Mapuche citizens and candidates (Castro 2001). While it is true that Mapuche migration has been on the increase, particularly to the capital and other urban centres, the Araucanía continues to be one of the regions with the greatest number of people of Mapuche ethnicity. According to the 2012 census, the region with the greatest number of people with Mapuche ethnicity is the Metropolitan region with 564,234, followed by the Araucanía with 285,441.
- (b) The analysis by polling station has a very specific limitation: not all the voters registered at a station actually voted. Consequently, while the calculation of the percentage of Mapuches by polling station may be accurate based on the criterion of inclusion (first or second surname), the percentage of Mapuche voters is unknown as there are no public records of who voted and who abstained. Therefore, we are bound necessarily to assume that abstention was randomly distributed between the




Figure 1. Units of analysis and data to be used.

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Mapuche and the non-Mapuche population, a question that also finds support in an empirical test. There is no other way of resolving this limitation.

Figure 1 shows the units of analysis and the data to be used. The number of municipalities to be studied is limited to those that have Mapuche mayoral candidates. There is no sense in analysing municipalities without a Mapuche mayoral candidate given that our objective is to study ethnic solidarity. A municipalities may well exist with a high percentage of Mapuche population but without Mapuche candidates. In a case like that, we cannot evaluate ethnic solidarity, so the analysis would be restricted to questions of party or coalition loyalty, a topic that falls outside the scope of this study.

The work is divided into four sections. In the first, we discuss theoretical developments on the ethnic vote and ethnic solidarity. In the second section, we explain the methodology to be used. In the third, we carry out an analysis of the data and test the hypothesis. In the final section, we outline the main conclusions of the study.

Theory

The conditions that favour the transformation of ethnic movements into political parties are a central concern of political science in the study of ethnic groups. There is enough evidence of this in Latin America, where the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador stand out, and to a lesser degree Colombia and Venezuela (Madrid 2005a, 2005b). Following Van Cott (2005), the creation of ethnic parties appears to be independent of the percentage of the population belonging to an ethnic group. For example, in Peru and Guatemala the percentage of the indigenous population is higher than Colombia and Venezuela, but neither country has generated ethnically inspired parties. Peru is a special case. According to Madrid (2011), even though there are no ethnic parties or movements presidential candidates from Fujimori on (including Toledo and Humala) have identified with the indigenous population. Indeed, their electoral performance has been substantially better in rural areas with a large indigenous population than in urban areas. Such candidates generate an *ethno-populist appeal* (Madrid 2011, 268) based on an independent and personalistic discourse that is typical of outsider candidates.

The case of Chile is at the opposite extreme. The indigenous population is close to 6%, one of the lowest percentages of the region. There are no ethnic parties. Rather, the traditional parties have co-opted the indigenous vote. Indeed, there is evidence that in some localities indigenous peoples act as brokers between local governments and the

communities. While in some places local chiefs coexist with intermediaries who compete to co-opt the vote, in others clientelistic relations are principally motivated by economic questions and exist to satisfy the needs of the communities (Durstun 2007). Finally, some studies have shown, following the comparative literature on clientelism (Auyero 1997; Günes-Ayata 1997; Fox 1994), that patron-client relations have changed in nature, allowing indigenous communities greater negotiating capacity (Gundermann 2003).

So what conditions favour the formation of ethnic parties? According to Van Cott (2005) and Birnir and Van Cott (2007), the emergence of ethnic parties is dependent on the coexistence of three basic conditions: decomposition of the traditional party system (a point advanced to some degree by Carlson 1984, 672), weakening of class divisions, and the organisation of ethnic groups. This is accompanied by loss of contact between parties and voters (Brancati 2008), and by problems of 'statehood', the most stable systems being an exception (Chandra 2005). According to Mainwaring (2006), and particularly in Andean countries in which there is a greater proliferation of indigenous parties, states experience difficulties in providing basic goods and services for the population. This leads not only to voters' detachment from the parties but also favours the appearance of outsiders and, of course, the emergence of new parties with specific demands. Consequently, racial heterogeneity frequently leads to greater party fragmentation (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994), a phenomenon seen not only in Latin America but more recurrently in Africa (Posner 2004). Additionally, and following Van Cott (2005), there are certain institutional conditions that favour the emergence of ethnic parties. They include decentralisation, indigenous quota laws and low entrance barriers for the creation of new parties. To this may be added some political conditions such as an increase in party fragmentation (showing electors' fragile loyalty to traditional parties), and the weakening of left-wing parties that had erstwhile often channelled indigenous interests (Van Cott 2005; Rice and Van Cott 2006). Where these conditions are present, the end result is an opening of the structure of political opportunities for the appearance of indigenous parties.

In regard to studies of the ethnic vote, many have been conducted in the United States and Canada (Kamin 1958; Landa, Copeland, and Grofman 1995), whose beginnings date back to the racial crises of the 1960s. They later spread to other latitudes, including Israel (Shamir and Arian 1982), South Africa (Peele and Morse 1974; Horowitz 1991), Benin (Wantchekon 2003), India (Chandra 2004), Ghana (Arthur 2009), Mali (Dunning and Harrison 2010), Peru (Madrid 2011), Sierra Leone, and Liberia (Batty 2011) among others.

The central thesis of these works is that voters and candidates of the same ethnic group have ties of solidarity. Beyond the party or ideological preferences of voters, the decisive factor is the ethnic filiation of the candidate. Consequently, the decision how to vote does not spring from a rational evaluation of the choices. What is more, ethnic solidarity not only motivates a decision to vote for candidates of a given ethnic group, but also to vote against the candidate of some other ethnic group.

One of the seminal works defending this position is Kamin (1958) in Canada. His experiment consisted of showing the interviewee a list of candidates, systematically changing their party label. He concluded that, despite the changes, the electors continued to prefer candidates with surnames associated with their ethnic group (see also Nelson 1979). A second key work along similar lines is by Raymond Wolfinger (1965), who introduced the term ethnic vote. As in an article by Greeley (1974), the argument is that ethnic

group membership is a robust predictor of electoral conduct provided that the group is capable of organising itself and competing electorally (see, in addition, Parenti 1967; Hahn and Almy 1971; Ambrecht and Pachon 1974).

The work of Dahl (1961) offers a different interpretation. For Dahl, the vote is a rational action that can be mediated but not determined by social, economic, and political conditions. Ethnic filiation is one of these factors, but far from the most decisive one. It may be that voters belonging to an ethnic group will vote for candidates from the same group, but that is explained more by political–ideological congruence than by the ethnic precedence of candidates and voters. According to Dahl (1961), the effect of ethnicity on electoral conduct tends to evaporate if the voters of that ethnic group are second or third generation. This happens because generations are very heterogeneous in terms of socioeconomic precedence and this makes their organisation into movements or parties practically unviable.

This debate is still open in the more contemporary literature. For example, in their writings on Africa, Basedau and Stroh (2012) note that ethnic parties are practically non-existent and that what really matters in voting intentions are social cleavages or simply the rationality of electors. Another interpretation comes from the United States, where support for the democratic candidates in gubernatorial elections in California was strongly mediated by their ethnic status (Jackson 2011). Finally, the work of Barreto and Nuño (2011) studying the Latino vote in 2004 produced similar results (see also Manzano and Sánchez 2010; McConaughy et al. 2010). They conclude that the probability of voting for the conservative candidate (Bush) was greater when the personal contact was with a campaign activist who was also Latino. The probability declines when the activist is not Latino (see, in addition, Barreto 2007). Consequently, while this work does not cast light on the impact of ethnic solidarity on the vote, it convincingly defends the idea that ethnic connections and mediation may favour a candidate who does not necessarily belong to that ethnic group.

This argument gains traction in Madrid's analysis (2011) of Peru. Even though his work is not about the ethnic link in campaigns, it notes that the discourse of some presidential candidates directed at the indigenous world does increase their capture of the vote. Indeed, it would seem that the identification that these groups feel with the candidate is reinforced by his or her physical aspect (Madrid 2011, 276).

Another approach is that of Gimpel et al. (2008), who study whether candidates who originate from the locality in which they are standing enjoy an electoral advantage. Their study seeks to establish whether having common origins with voters is a relevant factor and how much the latter care about being represented locally by a person from their own community. Following the reflections of Key (1949) on the importance of local politics (*localism*), the authors found that the relation between distance and electoral support was non-linear and operated in an exponential manner. In some places, for example, in the remotest geographical zones, distance is not synonymous with less support given that the emergence of local candidates is unlikely. Likewise, Johnston et al. (2001) evaluate the importance of contextual influences – chiefly spatial variations in voting patterns – in the 1997 British General Elections. They highlight the fact that electoral behaviour reflects where voters were living, what they experienced, and the social categories to which they belonged. In other words, they showed that spatial factors and local influence are relevant in understanding electoral conduct. This line of research may

explain the existence of ethnic solidarity in Chile, in that electoral behaviour is determined by spatial, geographic, social, and cultural factors.

Methodology

The objective of the study is to evaluate the presence, magnitude and variation of ethnic solidarity in the 2012 municipal elections in Chile, and especially in the Araucanía region. As already noted, the work is conducted at three levels of analysis: municipalities, polling stations, and individual persons. The dependent variable – for municipalities and polling stations – is the number of votes obtained by Mapuche and non-Mapuche candidates. The dependent variable in the analysis of opinion surveys is the electoral preference of voters for Mapuche candidates, regardless of the party the latter represent.

The central independent variable for the analysis of polling stations is the percentage of Mapuche voters registered on the electoral roll. For the analysis of individuals, the independent variable is the ethnic filiation of the interviewee. Naturally, the analysis includes a number of control variables that we shall discuss below.

For the analysis with aggregate data, we constructed a database for the 11 municipalities of the Araucanía in which Mapuche candidates competed in the mayoral elections (see Table 2 for descriptive data of the candidates and their political tendency). For each of these municipalities we added up the percentage of the vote obtained by the Mapuche candidates who competed. In the case of those municipalities in which more than one Mapuche candidate stood we added together the percentage of the vote obtained by each of them. We included also data for poverty and rurality. These socio-demographic data would come in useful later for our multilevel linear regression model. Details of the number of polling stations included in the analysis are provided in Table 3.

A second aspect necessary for establishing the influence of ethnic solidarity on the vote is to know the number of Mapuche voters per polling station, which in turn depends on knowing who are Mapuches and who are not. The main difficulty here is the criterion used

Table 2. Mapuche candidates who competed in the Mayoral elections for the Municipalities of the ninth region.

Municipality	Candidate	Political Party	Votes	% of valid votes	Elected
Nueva Imperial	Mario Hueichapan Leufuman	Independent	388	2.6	NO
Chol Chol	Arnoldo Nanculef Huaiquinao	Independent	616	10.4	NO
Chol Chol	Luis Huirilef Barra	Independent	3105	52.2	YES
Renaico	Juan Carlos Reinao Marilao	Independent	2192	41.0	YES
Saavedra	Juan Paillafil Calfulen	Independent	2689	42.7	YES
Non traditional parties candidates			8990		
Temuco	Francisco Huenchumilla Jaramillo	PDC ¹	29,905	37.5	NO
Saavedra	Ricardo Tripainao Calfulaf	PPD ²	57	0.9	NO
Curarrehue	Abel Painefilo Barriga	PPD	2507	55.6	YES
Saavedra	Domingo Nancupil Baeza	PRO ³	2009	31.9	NO
Galvarino	Fernando Huaiquil Paillal	PRO	3206	51.5	YES
Los Sauces	Ismael Catalino Pinoleo Paillali	PRO	72	1.5	NO
Lumaco	Manuel Painiqueo Tragnolao	PS ⁴	2585	44.4	NO
Centre left and left-wing candidates			40,341		
Freire	Cesar Ancao Rain	PRI ⁵	787	8.2	NO
Lautaro	Fernando Grunewaldt Millapan	PRI	224	1.5	NO
Centre right-wing candidates			1011		

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from www.servel.cl.

¹Christian Democratic Party; ²Party for Democracy; ³Progressive Party; ⁴Socialist Party; ⁵Independent Regionalist Party.

Table 3. Number of polling stations per municipality in which Mapuche candidates participated.

Municipality	Electoral district	Number of polling stations				Total
		Men	Women	Joint	New	
Cholchol	Cholchol	14	13	1	–	28
Curarrehue	Curarrehue	12	10	1	–	23
Freire	Freire	25	25	1	–	51
	Quepe	8	8	–	–	16
	Radal	2	2	1	–	5
Galvarino	Galvarino	18	16	–	1	35
Lautaro	Lautaro	42	40	1	3	86
	Pillanlelbun	3	3	–	–	6
Los Sauces	Los Sauces	14	12	–	–	26
Lumaco	Capitán Pastene	4	5	2	–	11
	Lumaco	8	7	1	1	17
	Pichipellahuen	1	–	3	–	4
Nueva Imperial	Nueva Imperial	43	41	–	3	87
Renaico	Renaico	14	14	1	–	29
Saavedra	Puerto Domínguez	2	3	4	–	9
	Saavedra	13	12	–	6	31
Temuco	Temuco centro	124	128	1	1	254
	Labranza	4	5	–	–	9
	Cerro Nielol	120	136	1	81	338
	Pedro de Valdivia	3	4	–	29	36
Total		474	484	18	125	1.101

Source: Prepared by the authors from data obtained from the Regional Electoral Tribunal of the Araucanía, www.teraraucaia.cl.

to differentiate. It may well be that someone who does not belong to this ethnicity may feel perfectly identified with its demands and the processes by which it seeks to secure them. Indeed it is possible that such voters may express their solidarity by voting for candidates of that ethnicity. However there is no way to identify these persons, let alone quantify them. For this reason, the criterion adopted is that proposed by Carlson (1984), which consists in identifying those who have Mapuche surname(s).

We proceeded as follows: from the electoral roll for the 2012 municipal elections we classified all the people listed in the 11 municipalities studied. Those who had no Mapuche surname we classified with a value of 0. Those who had one Mapuche surname we classified with a value of 1. Finally, we classified those people both of whose surnames were Mapuche with a value of 2. Since we knew the total number of people registered in each polling station, we were able to obtain the percentage of people with a Mapuche surname in each polling station of the 11 municipalities.

In summary, our database consisted of:

- Percentage of the vote obtained by Mapuche candidate(s) for each polling station in the 11 municipalities studied.
- Percentage of persons without Mapuche surnames, with one Mapuche surname, with two Mapuche surnames, and with at least one Mapuche surname, in the 11 municipalities studied.
- Levels of poverty and rurality of each municipality.

In Table 4 we shows statistic descriptive. These data allow us to establish whether people of Mapuche ancestry express ethnic solidarity by voting for Mapuche candidates. Naturally our study has limitations. The most important is the classification of voters into

Table 4. Descriptive statistics (Total polling stations).

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Non-Mapuche	1083	73.6	17.0	18.7	98.6
One surname (mapuche)	1083	12.9	6.1	1.2	34.2
Two surname (Mapuche)	1083	13.6	11.8	0	55.2
Turnout	1047	45.4	15.2	6.1	88.7
Electoral Registry by polling station	1047	329.3	36.6	107	351
Poverty	1101	25.3	5.2	21.2	36.8
Rurality	1101	25.3	24.5	6.8	78.6

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from www.servel.cl and www.ine.cl.

Mapuches and non-Mapuches. However, we believe that the decision to classify them by surnames, as supported by the literature on the ethnic vote (Carlson 1984), is the best way to proceed.


The total number of polling stations in the region was 1.101. Nevertheless, the SERVEL, shortly before the election, decides merged some polling stations. We know which polling stations were merged, but we do not know how this process was realised. Namely, if the polling station A was merged with polling station B, C, or D. Thus, we decided to exclude these polling stations from the analysis. Of 1.101 polling stations, we held 1.083. To this number, we also had to discount some polling stations that, for an unknown reason, do not have turnout registration. The final number of polling stations analysed is 1.047.

Data and method

We first provide a general overview showing the number of candidates with Mapuche surnames set against the percentage of Mapuche voters by municipality. Secondly, we analyse the rates of electoral participation (turnout) according to the portion of Mapuches by polling station and municipality. Thirdly, we relate the percentage of Mapuche voters by polling station to the percentage of the vote obtained by Mapuche mayoral candidates.

Graph 1 shows the correlation between the percentage of Mapuche candidates for mayor and councillor in 2012 and the percentage of Mapuche population by municipality. We have counted as Mapuche candidates those with one or more Mapuche surnames. The objective of this general overview is to identify those municipalities in which greater ethnic solidarity might be expected. The correlation between both variables is 0.86, indicating, as expected, that the greater the portion of Mapuches per municipality, the greater the presence of Mapuche candidates. Given this association between a high percentage of Mapuches per municipality and a high number of Mapuche candidates, one might be led to expect a significant level of ethnic solidarity in the vote.

With regard to electoral participation, the polling stations with the largest proportion of Mapuche voters have lower turnout than the municipalities with the smallest proportion of Mapuches. This is consistent with Lehoucq and Wall's (2004) observation that countries in which indigenous peoples have greater presence have lower levels of electoral turnout. There are two explanations for this: in the first place, indigenous inhabitants are socialised within a structure of authority that is foreign to the traditional party system; representative democracy is not the only way in which a political community may be constructed. Secondly, due to this, members of indigenous peoples have other mechanisms for participation and community organisation.




Graph 1. Percentage of Mapuche population and candidates, 2012 municipal elections.

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from www.sinim.gov.cl and www.servel.cl

Graph 2 shows the relationship between the percentage of voters with two Mapuche surnames and electoral turnout by polling station. In almost all the municipalities, the correlation is, in fact, inverse; i.e. the greater the percentage of Mapuche voters the lower is the electoral turnout. The most notable cases are the municipalities of Nueva Imperial, Galvarino and Lumaco. This correlation is supported by three models of multilevel linear regression (see [Table 5](#)). The dependent variable is the percentage of electoral participation (turnout). At the polling station level (level 1) the independent variable is the percentage of voters with two Mapuche surnames, with one Mapuche surname, and with no Mapuche surname, giving three models. The other independent variable at the polling station level is the size of the electoral roll, that is, the number authorised to vote. The independent variables at level 2 (municipality level) correspond to the percentage of rural population and the percentage of poor population. The coefficients of the models indicate that the greater the presence of Mapuche voters, the lower is the electoral turnout. The coefficient is negative both in the model with two surnames and in the model with one surname, although it is greater in the latter. Finally, in the model based on the percentage of voters without a Mapuche surname, the coefficient is positive. This supports the original idea that the greater the number of Mapuches registered at polling stations, the lower will be the turnout.

It is plausible think that electoral abstentionism only reflects distance from the state and the mechanism of traditional party representation, and that the communities with the greatest concentration of Mapuche population have other mechanisms of participation may account for these differences. We do not mean to say by this that such mechanisms are associated with protest or violent forms of expression associated with their historical demands. We simply suppose that given the cultural context of those Mapuche



Graph 2. Relation between percentage of voters with two Mapuche surnames and electoral participation (by polling station).

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from www.sinim.gov.cl and www.servel.cl

communities that still remain in their territories and have a more intense ethnic identity, these communities prefer to organise their political life according to their own patterns of internal organisation – probably, traditional politics make little sense to them. In fact, the

Table 5. Multilevel linear regression model. The dependent variable is electoral participation.

Variables	(1) Electoral participation	(2) Electoral participation	(3) Electoral participation
Two Mapuches surnames	-0.507*** (0.0714)		
One Mapuche surname		-1.100*** (0.107)	
No Mapuche surnames			0.541*** (0.0518)
Size of electoral register	-0.0779*** (0.0106)	-0.0797*** (0.0101)	-0.0720*** (0.0102)
Rurality percentage	0.565*** (0.0917)	0.604*** (0.0776)	0.809*** (0.0908)
Poverty percentage	1.117*** (0.258)	0.859*** (0.220)	0.819*** (0.221)
Constant	40.69*** (6.458)	53.59*** (6.052)	-5.342 (6.661)
Observations	1047	1047	1047
Number of groups	10	10	10

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from www.sinim.gov.cl and www.servel.cl.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

data do point in this direction. The municipalities we have selected vary greatly in the electoral support given to the Mapuche mayoral candidates. There are municipalities in which this candidate wins easily, and others in which he or she is roundly defeated. Whatever the result, the inverse relationship between the percentage of Mapuches by polling station and electoral turnout holds: Mapuches participate less, independently of the support garnered by the Mapuche mayoral candidate(s). To consolidate this hypothesis, future studies should include municipalities in which there is no Mapuche candidate. This would further test whether the inverse relationship between percentage of Mapuches and electoral turnout is a stable pattern.

To estimate the impact of ethnic solidarity on the vote, we analyse polling station by polling station the percentage of Mapuche voters together with the percentage of votes received by the Mapuche mayoral candidate. Naturally, this support is conditioned also by the candidate's political affiliation. This may call into question the causal relationship we have posited, for we do not know whether the success of Mapuche candidates is due to their ethnic identity or the political coalition backing them. In other words, what we have chosen to observe as 'ethnic solidarity' may simply be a reproduction of political support for that candidate: rather than their status as Mapuches, the fact that they represent a particular party or coalition may explain their electoral support.

To uphold the hypothesis of ethnic solidarity, our methodological argument is as follows: As we are working at polling station level and the results are aggregated at the level of the municipality, all the polling stations in that municipality have the same candidates. That is, all voters in the polling stations of that municipality receive identical ballot papers, in which the same candidates' names and the party they represent appear. What does vary from polling station to polling station is the percentage of Mapuche voters. So, if the percentage of votes for the Mapuche candidate increases with the percentage of Mapuches registered to vote in the respective polling station, the 'ethnic solidarity' hypothesis may be inferred. Naturally, we include some control variables in order to discard other possible effects.

It would be ideal to have access to the election results of these polling stations in earlier elections in order to control for time. These results exist, but the problem is that the composition of these polling stations in previous elections changed abruptly due to the introduction of the voluntary vote. At the present time, the polling stations have an average of between 300 and 350 voters. In earlier elections- with compulsory voting and voluntary voter registration- the number of people inscribed was substantially less. For this reason, it is very risky to include the polling stations' result at time $t-1$ given that their composition was then very different.

With this caveat in mind, [Table 6](#) shows the coefficient of correlation between the percentage of voters with at least one Mapuche surname and the percentage of the vote obtained by Mapuche candidates by polling station. The data are aggregated to the level of the municipality. As can be seen the municipality with the greatest solidarity is Lumaco; the municipality with the least solidarity is Los Sauces, which has a negative coefficient. The strength and directionality of solidarity is not necessarily associated with the portion of votes obtained by the Mapuche candidates. Thus, for example, in Lumaco and Galvarino the Mapuche candidates actually gained more than 40% of the vote. In Lumaco the Mapuche candidate was beaten while in Galvarino he won. In Renaico, meanwhile, the coefficient of correlation was close to zero, but the Mapuche candidate (in this case an


Table 6. Coefficient of correlation between voters with at least one Mapuche surname and the percentage of the vote obtained by the Mapuche candidates.

Municipality	Coefficient of correlation
Lumaco	0.89
Galvarino	0.56
Saavedra	0.52
Lautaro	0.26
Cholchol	0.24
Freire	0.21
Temuco	0.16
Nueva Imperial	0.06
Curarrehue	0.03
Renaico	-0.10
Los Sauces	-0.39

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from de www.sinim.gov.cl and www.servel.cl.

independent, outside the party coalitions) won with more than 40% of the vote. From these results it is evident that ethnic solidarity is not always present when Mapuche candidates are successful. Mapuche candidates may be successful, but with balanced sources of support, that is, support from both Mapuches and non-Mapuches.

Graph 3 shows ethnic solidarity. Each data point represents a polling station. The polling stations are grouped into clearly distinguishable municipalities. The first group is composed of the municipalities of Lumaco, Galvarino, Saavedra, and Cholchol. As we noted in the table above, ethnic solidarity is very visible. The second group of municipalities, composed by Curarrehue, Temuco, and Renaico presents a different picture. Naturally, the municipality one of Temuco (the capital of the Araucanía region) accounts for a

**Graph 3.** Ethnic solidarity. Polling stations and municipalities.

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from www.sinim.gov.cl and www.servel.cl

Table 7. Multilevel linear regression models. The dependent variable is the percentage of the vote obtained by the Mapuche candidates.

Variables	(1) Percentage of the vote obtained by the Mapuche candidates	(2) Percentage of the vote obtained by the Mapuche candidates	(3) Percentage of the vote obtained by the Mapuche candidates
Two Mapuche surnames	0.202*** (0.0402)		
One Mapuche surname		0.389*** (0.0629)	
No Mapuche surname			-0.210*** (0.0304)
Percentage of participation	0.00396 (0.0171)	0.0192 (0.0173)	0.0235 (0.0172)
Size of electoral register	0.00922 (0.00599)	0.0114** (0.00581)	0.00843 (0.00581)
Rurality percentage	-1.429*** (0.0513)	-1.453*** (0.0446)	-1.552*** (0.0526)
Poverty percentage	1.064*** (0.143)	1.238*** (0.124)	1.278*** (0.124)
Constant	20.18*** (3.617)	12.96*** (3.510)	34.98*** (3.717)
Observations	1047	1047	1047
Number of groups	10	10	10

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from www.sinim.gov.cl and www.servel.cl.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

large part of the polling stations. No linear relationship between the variables (percentage of Mapuches by polling station and percentage of votes obtained by Mapuche candidates) is observed, so there is no sign of ethnic solidarity. Finally, in the third group we show those municipalities in which the Mapuche candidates scored few votes: Freire, Nueva Imperial, Lautaro, and Los Sauces.

Table 7 shows a multilevel linear regression model designed to explain support for the Mapuche candidates. The unit of analysis is the polling station, while the central independent variables at level 1 (polling stations) are turnout, polling station size (number of registered voters), and the percentage of voters with one, two or no Mapuche surnames. We have built a model for each scenario. The variables at level 2 correspond to the percentage of poverty and rurality and function as statistical controls.

The results of model 1, which include voters with two Mapuche surnames, indicate that the greater the presence of this type of voter the greater the percentage of votes obtained by the Mapuche candidates. Even though the effect is quantitatively small, it is highly significant statistically. For every point increase in the portion of voters with two Mapuche surnames, the vote for Mapuche mayoral candidates increases on average by 0.2 percentage points. Model 2 shows the effect of the percentage of voters with one Mapuche surname on the votes cast for the Mapuche candidates. Here the coefficient is significant also, but greater in size. Finally, in model 3 the effect of the non-Mapuche voters is shown. As expected, the coefficient is significant, but in this case, negative.

Consequently, the presence of a greater portion of Mapuche voters favours the percentage of votes cast for Mapuche candidates. The effect is greater if the model is based on calculating only the number of voters with *one* Mapuche surname compared with voters with *two* Mapuche surnames. Naturally, if the calculation is based on voters with

Table 8. Number of interviewees by municipality and group.

	Urban Mapuche	Rural Mapuche	Non-Mapuche	Total
Curarrehue	36	75	114	225
Saavedra	73	92	142	307
Cholchol	50	119	106	275
	159	286	362	807

Source: Survey conducted for the FONDECYT project N° 1120206, 'Representation and ethnic minorities: right-wing party strategies in Mapuche areas'.

at least one Mapuche surname (i.e. with one or two Mapuche surnames) the effect is intermediate (0.3). The observable differences between model 1 and model 2 (two surnames and one surname) can be explained by the number of polling stations in each municipality. Thus, for example, if the percentage of voters with two Mapuche surnames is considered, Lumaco, Galvarino, and Cholchol show a higher level of ethnic solidarity, unlike the situation in Lautaro. This may be due to the low vote obtained by the Mapuche candidate in this municipality.


In synthesis, ethnic solidarity can be seen to vary from one municipality to another, depending largely on the electoral success of the Mapuche candidates. Generally speaking, the more successful the candidate the greater the ethnic solidarity, although it is also possible to think this relationship in a reverse way: the greater the ethnic solidarity, greater success of a candidate. The big exception is Renaico, where the Mapuche candidate obtained more than 40% of the vote but with uniform results across polling stations, with or without a predominance of Mapuche voters.

Our third level of analysis refers to the voters, for which we will use data from a recent and exclusive opinion poll conducted in the municipalities of Curarrehue, Cholchol, and Saavedra. Eight hundred and seven people were interviewed, both Mapuches and non-Mapuches. As Table 8 shows, we divided the sample into three groups: urban Mapuches, rural Mapuches, and non-Mapuches (both urban and rural). The data are weighted by the size of the municipality and the size of the groups.

The objective of this survey was, among other things, to estimate ethnic solidarity as a factor in the vote. We devoted two questions in the questionnaire to this:

Considering the characteristics of the candidates standing in the elections, with which of the following statements do you most agree?	(a) I don't care if the candidate is a Mapuche or not, as what matters to me is that his ideas are similar to mine. (b) I will always support the Mapuche candidate regardless of whether his ideas are similar to mine. (c) Don't know, no response
When voting for one of the following authorities (mayor, member of the Chamber of Deputies, senator), how important is it for you that the candidate is a Mapuche?	(a) It's not important (b) It's not very important (c) It's important (d) It's very important (e) Don't know, no response


The idea is to compare voters' readiness to vote for a Mapuche candidate regardless of whether the candidate's ideas are similar to those of the voter. Graph 4 shows the results. The predisposition to vote for Mapuche candidates regardless of their political position is clearly strongest among rural Mapuches, followed by urban Mapuches, and least strong among non-Mapuches. This is complemented by the results of the second question, which refers to the importance electors attach to the ethnic status of mayoral, Chamber



Graph 4. Percentage of interviewees who always vote for Mapuche candidates regardless of their political position.

Source: Survey conducted for the FONDECYT project N° 1120206, 'Representation and ethnic minorities: right-wing party strategies in Mapuche areas'.

of Deputies, or senatorial candidates. As [Graph 5](#) shows, almost half the rural Mapuches believe that the ethnic status of the candidate is important or very important, whereas a third of the urban Mapuches and only around 15% of the non-Mapuches do so.



Graph 5. Percentage of interviewees who consider it 'important' or 'very important' that candidates for mayor, member of the Chamber of Deputies, or senator is a Mapuche.

Fuente: Survey conducted for the FONDECYT project N° 1120206, 'Representation and ethnic minorities: right-wing party strategies in Mapuche areas'.

Table 9. Probit regression models. The dependent variable is the ethnic solidarity of the vote.

Variables	Support for Mapuche candidate regardless of ideology	Importance of mayoral candidate being a Mapuche
Urban Mapuches	0.533*** (0.172)	0.579*** (0.132)
Rural Mapuches	0.665*** (0.144)	0.801*** (0.114)
Curarrehue	-0.549*** (0.153)	-0.0390 (0.117)
Saavedra	-0.506*** (0.144)	-0.443*** (0.119)
Sex (1 = Man/0 = Woman)	-0.208 (0.127)	-0.206** (0.103)
Age	0.00594 (0.00376)	0.00226 (0.00301)
NSE (1 = Middle-high/4 = Low)	0.127* (0.0774)	-0.0468 (0.0603)
Constant	-1.551*** (0.360)	-0.478 (0.291)
Observations	809	809

Source: Survey conducted for the FONDECYT project N° 1120206, 'Representation and ethnic minorities: right-wing party strategies in Mapuche areas'.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

These descriptive data confirm our initial suppositions about the influence of ethnic solidarity on the vote. For further proof, we constructed two probit models (see Table 9). In the first, the dependent variable has a value of 1 when the statement is 'I will always support the Mapuche candidate regardless of whether his ideas are similar to mine,' and 0 for the other options. In the second, the dependent variable has a value of 1 when the interviewees consider it to be 'very important' or 'important' that the mayoral candidates are Mapuches, and 0 for the other options.

The independent variables are the following:

- (a) **Urban Mapuches.** This category corresponds to people identified as Mapuches who live in urban areas of the selected municipalities. A code of 1 is assigned to those who belong to this group, and 0 to those who do not.
- (b) **Mapuches rurales.** This category corresponds to people identified as Mapuches who live in rural areas of the selected municipalities. A code of 1 is assigned to those who belong to this group, and 0 to those who do not.
- (c) **Curarrehue.** This category corresponds to all the people who live in this municipality. A code of 1 indicates residence in this municipality; 0 indicates residence in another municipality.
- (d) **Saavedra.** This category corresponds to the all the people who live in this municipality. A code of 1 indicates residence in this municipality; 0 indicates residence in another municipality.
- (e) **Cholchol.** This category corresponds to the all the people who live in this municipality. A code of 1 indicates residence in this municipality; 0 indicates residence in another municipality.
- (f) **Sex.** The code 1 indicates men y the code 0 indicates women
- (g) **Age.** Indicates the age of the interviewee.
- (h) **Socioeconomic level.** Indicates the socioeconomic level of the interviewee.

The results of each model indicate that the rural Mapuches are more likely to support the central statements in each model – that they always vote for a Mapuche candidate regardless of his or her political preferences, and that they consider it important or very important that the mayoral candidate is a Mapuche. The probability is smaller for urban Mapuches. By default the model excludes the non-Mapuches, who are treated as the reference category.

These data, then, confirm our central hypothesis about ethnic solidarity. We have demonstrated it from aggregate data at the level of municipality, polling station, and individual opinion. Working at three levels allowed us to make inferences with greater specificity and confidence.

Conclusions

In this article, we have provided a general picture of the part played by ethnic solidarity at the municipal level in the 2012 local elections. After analysing results at three levels – municipalities, polling stations, and individuals – we conclude that such solidarity does exist. Our findings in the study of individuals are based on an opinion survey in the municipalities of Curarrehue, Saavedra, and Cholchol. At each level of analysis the results point unequivocally to the same conclusion: Mapuches vote preferentially for candidates of their own ethnic group.

The results also lead us to believe that while the pattern of Mapuche voting exists, the traditional parties continue to be relevant. Ethnic solidarity is more likely to emerge in local elections than in congressional elections; in the latter case the larger territorial size of electoral districts compared to municipalities makes it more difficult for ethnic factors to determine the size of a candidate's vote. The parties continue to predominate and have been able to reproduce support for their incumbent candidates. Even so, given the evidence presented here, the parties have incentives to present candidates with a Mapuche surname. Given that identification with a party or coalition is not enough to secure the loyalty of voters in areas with a large indigenous population the fact that the candidate belongs to the ethnic group concerned makes him or her closer and more familiar. In other words, a combination of ideological alignment and ethnic group membership makes the ideal formula for the electoral success of parties and coalitions.

Pursuing this argument, evidence of ethnic solidarity's influence on the vote does not imply necessarily that the conditions are present for the emergence of an ethnic political party. The traditional parties have proved fairly astute in retaining control of the territory, and they have done so mainly through local politics. The Chilean case, then, suggests that a dual perspective is needed to understand electoral processes. Firstly, as a function of the ethnic characteristics of candidates and voters; secondly as a function of strategies of the traditional parties to block the appearance of an ethnic party, and thus monopolise representation. As we have shown, the most commonly used mechanism is to tap into ethnic solidarity by including people with Mapuche surnames in their lists of candidates.

Note

1. Chile is a unitary state and is divided into 15 regions. Each region is divided into municipalities, which are the country's smallest political-administrative units (345 in all).

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